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LEWIS v. JEFFERS
110 S. Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
After injecting his ex-girlfriend with a lethal dose of heroin,
Jimmie Wayne Jeffers choked the victim until she died and then hit the
dead victim in the face several times. When his current girlfriend arrived
on the scene, Jeffers ordered her to inject more heroin into the victim and
to choke her while he took pictures so that he could prove she was an
accomplice to the ex-girlfriend's murder. An Arizona jury convicted
Jeffers of first-degree murder and the trial judge sentenced Jeffers to
death after finding two aggravating factors: (1) Jeffers created a grave
risk of death to another person in the commission of a murder, and (2)
Jeffers committed the murder in an especially heinous, cruel, and
depraved manner. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(3) (1989). On direct
review, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated Jeffers' death sentence and
remanded for resentencing in light of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), which requires the
consideration of anything offered as mitigation evidence.
At the second sentencing hearing, the trial judge again found the
same aggravating circumstances with no mitigating factors and sentenced
Jeffers to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the sentence but
reversed the trial judge's finding thatJeffers"knowingly created agrave
risk of death to another person. . . in addition to the victim of the
offense." The court also concluded that the State had failed to prove the
"cruelty" aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the
Arizona Supreme Court upheld the death sentence, holding that the
events surrounding the murder supported the finding that the murder was
especially heinous and depraved. Jeffers eventually petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus in U.S. District Court, alleging that Arizona's interpretation ofits "especially heinous ordepraved" aggravating circumstance
was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and that his sentence was
unsupported by the evidence.
The District Court noted that under Arizona law a murder that is
especially heinous and depraved "includes the infliction of gratuitous
violence upon the victim and the indication that the defendant committed
the crime with relish."Jeffersv. Ricketts, 627 F. Supp. 1334,1360 (Ariz.
1986) (citations omitted). Based on the facts of the crime, the court
rejected Jeffers' constitutional challenge to the statute. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, struck down Jeffers' death
sentence as arbitrary because the "standard of heinousness and depravity
delineated in prior Arizona cases cannot be applied in a principled
manner to Jeffers."Jeffersv.Ricketts, 832 F.2d 476,486 (9th Cir. 1987).
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit reviewed anumber ofArizona
Supreme Court decisions which both defined and applied the "especially
heinous ... or depraved" circumstance. Then the court compared the
facts of those cases with the facts of Jeffers' case. The state petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit
and reinstated the death sentence for the following reasons:
a) Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating circumstance, as narrowed and applied, is constitutionally sufficient.
The Court saw its decision in Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047
(1990) as controlling in this case. In Walton, the Court determined
Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance was constitutionally sufficient because the Arizona Supreme
Court gave substance to the operative terms of the statute through

definitions. The Court concluded that the definitions gave meaningful
guidance to the sentencer and thus the aggravating circumstance was
constitutional. Id. at 3058. The Jeffers Court held that its decision in
Walton "squarely forecloses any argument that Arizona's aggravating
circumstance, as construed by the Arizona Supreme Court, fails to
channel the sentencer's discretion." Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S.Ct. 3092,
3100-3101 (1990). The Court failed to mention that its Walton decision
relied primarily on the conclusion that the murder was especially cruel.
The Supreme Court did not grant review of the adequacy of the Arizona
Supreme Court's construction of "cruelty" in this case.
b) A rational factfinder could have reached the conclusion that
Jeffers' conviction was supported by the evidence.
The Court restated its holding inJacksonv. Virginia,443 U.S. 307
(1979), that when a federal habeas corpus claimant alleges that his state
conviction is unsupportedby the evidence, federal courts must determine
"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. at
3103. The Court held that the Jackson considerations also apply to review of capital sentences. Like findings of fact, state court findings of
aggravating circumstances oftenrequire asentencer"to resolve conflicts
in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Id.Thus, a state court's finding
of an aggravating circumstance in a particular case is arbitrary and
capricious only if no reasonable sentencercouldhave similarly concluded.
Given the evidence surrounding Jeffers' murder of his ex-girlfriend, the
Court concluded that a rational factfinder could have reached the
Arizona Supreme Court's finding that Jeffers committed his murder in
an especially heinous and depraved manner.

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Jeffers argued before the United States Supreme Court that the
Ninth Circuit correctly held that Arizona's construction of its statutory
aggravating circumstances contravened the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) and Maynard v.
Cartwright,486 U.S. 356 (1988). Both Godfrey andMaynardheldthat
the "vileness" or "heinousness" aggravating factors could be constitutionally applied only if a state supreme court monitored the use of those
factors and insured that a narrowing construction of those factors was
applied by the sentencer. Jeffers claimed that the Arizona Supreme
Court violated Godfrey and Maynard because it failed to confine the
application of aggravating circumstances within constitutionally sufficient narrowing constructions.
TheU.S. Supreme Court mischaracterizedJeffers' claim as one of
a general right to comparative proportionality review by the appellate
court. The Court therefore relied on its holding in Pulley v. Harris,465
U.S. 37 (1984) which covers a broader range of cases than Godfrey and
Maynard.ThePulleydecision holds that the eighth amendment does not
require proportionality review by appellate courts in every case. In other
words, the eighth amendment does not require state appellate courts to
compare a death sentence with penalties imposed in similar cases before
itaffirms asentence ofdeath. Cf.Godfreyv. Georgia,446U.S.120(1980).
Because Jeffers' review involved the application of a narrowing construction of an aggravating circumstance, the review was found to be
limited to a determination of whether the state court's decision was
arbitrary or capricious.
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Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Blackmun found fault with the
Arizona Supreme Court's narrowing construction of the aggravating
factor of "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner." Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(6) (1989). Blackmun reasoned that the Arizona
Supreme Court had identified many such factors and had "shown itself
so willing to add new factors when a perceived need arises, that the body
of its precedents places no meaningful limitations on the application of
this aggravating circumstance." Jeffers, 110 S.Ct. at 3111. In other
words, Arizona's narrowing construction of the aggravating factor is not
prospective, but rather retrospective in that it expands the definition to
include whatever characterizes the case currently under review.
Blackmun also argued that a proportionality review that involves
a comparison between the case under review and prior state court
decisions applying the same aggravating factor, is necessary in capital
cases no matter what standard of review the habeas court uses. The
comparison would be a means of determining whether the state court's
application of its construction to the instant case expands the scope ofthe
aggravating factor in such a way as to make a previously valid limiting
construction unconstitutionally broad. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. at 3113. The
comparison approach would allow a defendant on federal habeas to raise
challenges based on how the aggravating circumstance had previously
been construed by the reviewing court.
Mandating use of the "rational factfinder" standard established in
Jackson v. Virginia,443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Court also said that a state
court's finding of an aggravating circumstance is arbitrary or capricious
"if and only if no reasonable sentencer could have so concluded."
Jeffers, 110 S.Ct. at 3103. Curiously, the Court also relied on a
dissentingopinion by Justice White in Godfrey v. Georgia,446 U.S. 420
(1980). White reasoned that when the issue on review is solely whether
a state court properly found the existence of a constitutionally narrowed
aggravating circumstance, the Court has never required federal courts
"to peermajestically overthe [state] court's shoulder so that [they] might
second-guess its interpretation of facts that quite reasonably- perhaps
even quite plainly- fit within the statutory language." Id. at 450. Thus,
the Court concluded that "respect for a state court's findings of fact and

application of its own law counsels against the sort of de novo review
undertaken by the Court of Appeals in this case." Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. at
3102.
The Jeffers decision marks a significant change in habeas cases.
Lower federal courts must now apply the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), which says that when a federal habeas
claimant alleges thathis state conviction is unsupported by the evidence,
federal courts must determine only whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime or the appropriately
narrowed aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore,
there will be less supervision of application of the Virginia vileness
factor in federal habeas cases.
Virginia, like Arizona, applies its vileness factor retrospectively,
expanding the definition to accommodate the case under review. (See
case summary of Mu'min v. Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue.)
At trial, an attempt can be made to combat this unfair "moving
target" approach. Defendant should try to obtain notice and an opportunity to defend against factors upon which the Commonwealth will rely
and to limit the Commonwealth to those factors. This can be done by
filing a pretrial motion for a bill of particulars which compels the
prosecution: (a) to identify the aggravating factors upon which the
Commonwealth will rely, including how many and which of the three
vileness components will be asserted; and (b) to identify the narrowing
construction which will be used and to supply evidence supporting that
assertion.
If the response from the Commonwealth is general and simply
names everything in the statute, the defense attorney should look at the
evidence and make a motion to strike factors which are not supported by
the evidence, prohibiting the Commonwealth from relying on an aggravating factor, or component thereof, which is unsupported by the
evidence.
Summary and analysis by:
Ginger M. Jonas

CLEMONS v. MISSISSIPPI
110 S. Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In need of cash, Chandler Clemons called a pizza delivery man
with the intent to rob him. After taking money and some pizza from the
delivery vehicle, Clemons shot the delivery man, Arthur Shorter, even
though Shorter begged for his life. Clemons fled the scene and the victim
died shortly thereafter. The trial court convicted Clemons of capital
murder. At the sentencing hearing, the State presented-evidence of two
aggravating factors: (1) the murder was committed during the course of
a robbery for pecuniary gain, and (2) the murder was an "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" killing. Finding both aggravating factors
present and that they sufficiently outweighed any mitigating circumstances, the jury sentenced Clemons to death.
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Clemons'
sentence but found that the Mississippi aggravating circumstance of an
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" killing was constitutionally
invalid in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (holding the "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance invalid under eighth and
fourteenth amendments because the statutory language did not direct the
jury's discretion in deciding when the death penalty is appropriate).

However, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that "when one aggravating circumstance is found to be invalid or unsupported by the
evidence, a remaining valid aggravating circumstance will nonetheless
support the death penalty verdict." Clemons v. State, 535 So.2d 1354,
1362 (Miss. 1988). Clemons petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for certiorari, and in an opinion filed by Justice White, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia, the Supreme Court vacated
Clemons' sentence and remanded the case to the Mississippi Supreme
Court.

HOLDING
The Court held that the United States Constitution does not
prevent a state appellate court from upholding a death sentence that is
based in part on an invalid or improperly applied aggravating circunstance, as long as the appellate court either reweighs the aggravating and
mitigating evidence or conducts a harmless error review. The Court
vacated Clemons' sentence and remanded the case to the Mississippi
Supreme Court because it was unclear whether that court correctly
employed either of those methods of review.

